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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
SALT LAKE CITY, A MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Defendant and. Respondent. 
Case No. 
9347 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was commenced in the District Court of the 
Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, for a declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of 
Chapter 111 of the Laws of Utah, 1959, relating to the with-
holding of state income t~xes from wages paid to etnployees 
by employers. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 12, 1959, Chapter 11i ofthe Laws of Utah, 1959, 
being entitled "An Act * * * Providing for the Deduction 
and Withholding of Individual Income Tax from Wages Paid 
by Employers to Resident Employees, and Providing for the 
Reimbursement of Expenses in Inaugurating and Administering 
the Withholding Provisions of This Act" became a law amend-
ing Section 59-14-71, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended 
by Chapter 124 of the Laws of Utah, 1955. (Paragraph 3 of 
appellant's complaint as admitted by paragraph 3 of respond-
ent's Answer, R. 1-4, 9). (Emphasis added above). The 
appellant is a municipal corporation of the State of Utah and, 
as such, is an "employer" paying "wages" to "employees" 
within the purview of said act, and is subject to the require· 
ments contained therein. (Paragraphs 2 and 4 of appellant's 
complaint as admitted by paragraphs 2 and 4 of respondent's 
Answer, R. 1, 4, 9). Chapter 111 of the Laws of Utah, 1959, 
does not provide for ''reimbursement" to "employers" of 
expenses in inaugurating . and administering the withholding 
provisions of said act. (Paragraph 5 of appellant's complaint 
as admitted by paragraph 5 of respondent's Answer, R. 4, 9). 
The defendant is charged with the enforcement and adminis-
tration of Chapter 111 of the Laws of Utah, 1959. (Paragraph 
7 of respondent's answer, R. 4, 9). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
CHAPTER 111 OF THE LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, VIO-
LATES ARTICLE VI, SECTION 23 OF THE CONSTITU-
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TION OF THE STATE OF UTAH IN THAT THE SUBJECT 
MATTER OF SAID ACT IS NOT CLEARLY EXPRESSED 
IN THE TITLE THEREOF. 
POINT II 
THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED UPON THE APPEL~ 
LANT AS AN "EMPLOYER" UNDER CHAPTER 111 OF 
THE LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, TO COLLECT A,ND REMIT 
STATE INCOME TAXES TO THE RESPONDENT WITH-
OUT COMPENSATION FOR ITS SERVICES CONSTI-
TUTES AN UNLAWFUL TAKING OF PROPERTY WITH-
OUT DUE PROCESS-OF LAW A·ND INVOLUNTARY 
SERVITUDE. 
POINT III 
CHAPTER 111 OF THE LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, VIO-
LATES ARTICLE VI, SECTION 22, OF THECONSTITU-
TION OF THE STATE OF. UTAH FOR ITS FAILURE TO 
SET FORTH THE STATUTE IT- AMENDS AT-LENGTH. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RE-
SPONDENT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 
PLEADINGS. 
POINT V 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT 
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS TO APPELLANT. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CHAPTER 111 OF THE LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, VIO-
LATES ARTICLE VI, SECTION 23 OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE STATE OF UTAH IN THAT THE SUBJECT 
MATTER OF SAID ACT IS NOT CLEARLY EXPRESSED 
IN THE TITLE THEREOF. 
Article VI, Section 23 of the Utah Constitution provides 
as follows: 
"Except general appropriation bills, and bills for 
the codification and general revision of laws, no bill 
shall be passed containing more than one subject, 
which shall be clearly expressed in its title." (Emphasis 
added). 
The title of Chapter 111 of the Laws of Utah, 1959, 
sets forth the subject matter of the act and states, among other 
things, that the act provides "for the Reimbursement of Ex-
penses in Inaugurating and Administering the Withholding 
Provisions of This Act." Respondent admits that the act does 
not provide for "reimbursement" to "employers" of expenses 
in inaugurating and administering the withholding provisions 
of the act. In fact the body of the act does not provide "reim-
bursement" to anyone for sums expended in effecting the with-
holding provisions of the act. 
Respondent argues that the term "reimbursement" as used 
in the title of the subject act necessarily refers to the expenses 
incurred by it in carrying out the program of the withholding 
tax provided by the statute. The fallacy in this argument lies 
in its failure to recognize the basic difference between the terms 
.4 
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"reimbursement" and "appropriation." The only reference to 
expenses involved in the administration .. of the withholding 
provisions of Chapter 111 of the Laws of Utah, 1959, is con-
tained in Section ( 5) of the act which. reads . as follows: 
.. ( 5) For the necessary expenses of administering the 
withholding provisions of this act to June 30, 1961, 
including the use of necessary tabulating devices and 
cards, auditing and clerical services, fprms, stationery, 
stamps and printing, there is appropriated from the 
Uniform Schol Fund to the tax commission, the sum 
of $125,000.00 and to the :finance commission the sum 
of $60,000.00." (Emphasis added). 
There can be no' question that the Legislature intended 
the above section of the act to appropriate funds to the various 
state departments charged with the enforcement of the act 
after its effective date, i.e., May 12, 1959. Thus the body of 
the act clearly contemplated an "appropriation" for future 
expenses, not a ·~reimbursement". for past expenses incurred 
in inaugurating and administering the withholding provisions 
of ·the act. Indeed, the respondent was without authority to 
effectuate the provisions of such act until it had become law 
upon ·the aforementioned date, and upon that date the Legis-
lature provided the respondent with the necessary fnnds for 
anticipated· future expenses in carrying out the· purposes of 
the act. It is too clear for argument that Section 5 of the act 
here involved constituted an "appropriation~· only for the 
necessary expense of administering the act from its .. effective 
date to June 30, 1961. The absence of any provision for "re-
imbursement" to employers for their expenses involved in 
inaugurating and administering the withholding provisions 
of the act renders it fatally defective. 
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It has been held in many cases that the primary meaning 
of the verb "reimburse" is to pay back; to make return or 
restoration of an equivalent for something paid, expended, 
or lost; to indemnify; to make whole. Woerz v. Schumaker, 
161 N.Y. 530, 56 N.E. 72; Perkins v. Brown, 179 Wash. 597, 
38 P.2d 253, 101 A.L.R. 275; See Words and Phrases, Perma-
nent Edition for additional cases so holding. Likewise the noun 
"reimbursement" has been held to mean pay back, to make 
restoration, to repay that expended. Los Angeles County v. 
Frisbie, 19 Cal.2d 634, 122 P.2d 526. And it has been held 
that "reimbursement" presupposes previous payment. Solimine 
v. Hollander, 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A.2d 344, 348. See Words 
and Phrases, Permanent Edition, for other cases similarly de-
fining "reimbursement." 
On the other hand the cases clearly define an "appro-
priation" as the setting apart from the public revenue of fl. 
certain SUffl: of money for a specified object, in such a manner 
that the executive officers of the government are authorized 
to use that money, and no more, for that object, and for no 
other. Hunt v. Callaghan, 32 Ariz. 235, 257 P. 648; State ex 
rel. Murray v. Carter, 167 Okla. 473, 30 P.2d 700; Grable v. 
Blackwood, 180 Ark. 311, 22 S.W.2d 41; See Words and 
Phrases, Permanent Edition, for additional cases. It has also 
been held that there is a distinction between an "appropria-
tion" and the making of "expenditures"-the latter being the 
act of expending, a laying out of money, or a disbursement, 
while the former means to set apart for, or assign to a par-
ticular person or use in exclusion of all others. Suppiger v. 
Enking, 60 Idaho 292, 91 P.2d 362. 
Applying the rule that the ordinary meaning and under-
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standing of a word will be employed .in construing statutes, 
it is clear that the legislature contemplated some form .of 
refund or repayment for prior expenditures incurred in con-
nection ·with the collection of income taxes withheld from 
wages by reason of its use of the term "reimbursement" in the 
title of the act. The only persons that could have been reason-
ably contemplated thereunder would be "employers" as defined 
in the body of the act inasmuch as . they constituted the only 
class of person~ under the act who were charged with affirma-
tive duti~s necessitating the outlay of cash expenditures to 
effectuC;lte the purposes of the act witJ;10ut provision for prior 
paY:ment of such, expenses. The expenses of the respondent 
and .the State Finance Commission were adequat~ly provided 
for in advance by a specific appropriation contained in the act. 
It necessarily follows, therefore, that the subject matter of 
Chapter 111 of the Laws of Utah, 1959, was not clearly 
expressed in its title as required by Article VI, Section 23 of 
the Utah Constitution for two reasons: 
1. The body of the act does not provide for "reimburse-
ment" to employers for their expenses in inaugurafing and 
administering the withholding provisions contained therein. 
2. The title of the act contains no reference to an "appro-
priation" to defray the future expenses of the State Tax Com-
mission in inaugurating and administering the withholding 
provision of· the act, and the inclusion .of such an "appropria-
tion" within the body of the -act is inconsistent with the title 
thereof· 
In the case of Pass v. Kanell et al., 98 U. 511, 100 P.2d 
972, this court held that ·the title to an . act does not purport 
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to state the details, but it must be broad enough to include 
the subject of the legislation. In that case the majority opinion 
held the statute contained subject matter not clearly expressed 
in the title and stated as follows at page 975 of 100 P.2d: 
"We fail to discover anything in the title 'Registra-
tion of Motor Vehicles' that would· justify the inclusion 
of liability of owners of rent automobiles for negli-
gence of the drivers of such rented automobiles." 
In view of the holding in the Kanell case, appellant is 
confident that this court will conclude that there is nothing 
in the term "reimbursement" as used in the title of Chapter 
111 of the Laws of Utah, 1959, that would justify the inclusion 
of an "appropriation" to the respondent for its future expenses 
in carrying out assigned duties and obligations under the with-
holding provisions of said act. 
In addition to the above objection to the title of Chapter 
11 i of the Laws of Utah, 1959, the attention of this court is 
directed to the limitation expressed in the title of said act to 
"Resident Employees." An examination of the act itself, par-
ticularly Sections (1) (a) and (2) (b) thereof, reveals that 
the body of the act covers all employees, not just resident em-
ployees. The sections referred to above read as follows: 
" ( 1) (a) Commencing July 1, 1959, every employer 
making payment of wages shall deduct and withhold 
from wages an amount equal to seven per cent of the 
total amount required to be deducted and withheld 
by an employer. from wages of an employee under the 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of the United 
States. The amount of tax withheld shall be computed 
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without regard to any other amount required to be 
withheld thereunder." 
"(2) (b) The term 'employee' means and includes 
every individual performing services for an employer, 
either within or without, or both within and without 
the State of Utah, the performances of which services 
constitutes, establishes and determines the relationship 
between the parties as that of employer and employee, 
and includes officers of corporations, individuals, in-
cluding elected officials, performing services for the 
United States Government or any agency or instru-
mentality thereof, or the state of Utah or any county, 
city, municipality or political subdivision thereof." 
This is a classic example of the failure of the title of an 
act to clearly express the subject matter of the act itself. The 
accepted, and indeed the required, practice in drafting legis-
lation is to use language in titles which is broad enough to 
cover the subject of the legislation, not to resort to language 
which is more limited in scope than the body of the act. See 
Pass v. Kanell, supra. Appellant would further point out that, 
even if such act itself was only applicable to withholding of 
income taxes from resident employees, it would fail for the 
reason that such a classification would unconstitutionally dis-
criminate against resident employees. There can be no doubt 
that the use of the term "Resident Employees" in the title of 
this act was the result of mistake or carelessness on the part 
of those responsible for drafting the bill. Such mistake or 
carelessness, however, cannot be the basis for breathing life 
into an invalid act. 
For the reasons above stated, Chapter 111 of the Laws 
of Utah, 1959, fails to meet the requirements of Article VI, 
Section 23 of the Utah Constitution. 
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POINT II 
THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED ,UPON THE APPEL-
LANT AS AN "EMPLOYER" UNDER CHAPTER 111 OF 
THE ~AWS OF UTA;E-f, 195~,TO.COLLECT AND REMIT 
STATE INCOME TAXES TO THE RESPONDENT WITH-
OUT COMPENSATION FOR ITS SERVICES CONSTI-
TUTES AN UNLAWFUL TAKING OF PROPERTY WITH-
OUt DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND INVOLUNTARY 
SERVITUDE. 
• I • • 
To enforce collection of a tax impos~.d under ~n invalid 
law is to take the property of the taxpayer without due process 
o~ law. ]. & A. Freiberg Co. v. Dawso~) D.C. Ky:,· 274 F. 
420, affirmed in Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries & Ware house 
Co.J 41 S. Ct. 272, 255 U:S. 288, 65 L.Ed. 638. It would there-
for.e follow that the ·enforced c~llection of state income t~~~s 
by employers under the requirements of Chapter 111 of the 
Laws of Utah, 1959, would likewise constitute. the taki~g of 
such employers' property without due process of law co~trary 
to the pr?visions of the st~te or federal .constitutions ~f s~ch 
statute is invalid for any of the reasons asserted under Points 
I and III herein. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of the ·United States; in 
the leading case of Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pany} 240 U.S. 1, 60 L.Ed. 493, decided in 1915, although 
holding that the ·due process clause of the 5th Amendment to 
the Federal Constitution is not a limitation upon the taxing 
power . conferred upon . Congress by the Constitution and that 
.the duty cast upon corporations to collect an income tax. and 
absorb the cost to which they are thereby subjected is not 
10 
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repugnant to due process of law as a taking of property without 
compensation, also placed a limitation upon that ruling by 
stating, at page 504 of 60 L.Ed.: 
"And no change in the situation here would arise 
even if it be conceded, as we think it must be, that this 
doctrine would have no application in a case where, 
although there was a seeming exercise of the taxing 
power, the ar:t complained of was so arbitrary as to 
constrain to the conclusion that it was not the exertion 
of taxation, but a confiscation of property; that is, a 
taking of the same in violation of the 5th Amendment; 
* * *." (Emphasis added). 
In view of the increased complexities of income tax with-
holding requirements and the extension of such withholding 
provisions to cover virtually all wages paid by employers, 
rather than a few isolated cases, it would appear that the time 
has arrived for a re-evaluation of the confiscatory nature of 
such tax programs. It is a matter of common knowledge that 
the costs incidental to the employment of wage earners in 
the form of frequent accountings to the federal and state 
governments upon matters of such complexity as require the 
employment of specially trained personnel for that purpose 
is stifling the emergence of new small businesses which have 
served historically as the cornerstone of our free enterprise 
system. At the present time employers are being charged with 
the direct responsibility of accounting to various governmental 
agencies for a substantial portion of the wages paid to their 
employees and the administrative costs incidental thereto have 
steadily increased over the years without provision for com-
pensation to such employers for their out of pocket expense 
in securing to government its vital nourishment. It is the 
11 
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appellant's contention that the time is long overdue for our 
courts to reconsider the inequality of withholding taxes. which 
places upon the employer the unequal burden of sustaining 
government and consequently results in the destruction of the 
· most valuable irreplaceable natural resources ·of this country 
-human initiative and creativeness. · 
There is no· concept more rooted in our ·constitutional 
form of government than that which prohibits the exaction 
of involun.t~ry servitude. See McGrew v. Industrial Comm.1 96 
U. 203, .85 P.2d 608. The imposition of costly requirements 
that employers collect and remit to government the fruits of 
.. taxation .from the wages of their employees without compen-
sati~:m for such services clearly places the employer in a position 
of involuntary servitude. To hold otherwise, as some cases have 
done, place.s . the convenience of tax collection fqr the gov-
ernment above the freedom of the individual. In addition 
employers are subjected to "double taxation" under such cir-
cumstances inasmuch as their ordinary tax burden is increased 
by their collection and remittance costs solely by reaso~ of 
their classification as an employer. Thus such costs, which 
are not borne equally by thetaxpaying public, become a~ addi-
t,iona.l tax burden upon employers incidental to. the imposition 
. of a completely separate tax upon incomes inc~u~ng that of 
. employers . 
. For the reasons above stated the appellant, as an .. "em-
ployer" . pnder the income tax withholding law enacted by 
Chapter lllof the Laws of Utah, .1959, herewith submits that 
the enforcement . of said Act by the respondent against the 
appellant is grossly unfair upon its face, deprives the appellant 
of its property without due process of law and subjects it to 
12 
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a state of involuntary servitude. In this connection it is to be 
noted that the legislature has provided reimbursement to the 
respondent for its expenses in collecting and remitting local 
sales taxes to municipalities, including the appellant, under 
Section 11-9-7, U.C.A. 1953, as enacted by Chapter 114 of 
the Laws of Utah, 1959. 
POINT III 
CHAPTER 111 OF THE LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, VIO-
LATES ARTICLE VI, SECTION 22, OF THE C~NSTITU­
TION OF THE STATE OF UTAH FOR ITS FAILURE TO 
SET FORTH THE STATUTE IT AMENDS AT LENGTH. 
Chapter 111 of the Laws of Utah, 1959, providing for 
withholding of income taxes on all incomes in Utah, was 
passed by the Legislature on March 12, 1959. Chapter 112 
of the Laws of Utah, 1959, relating to the withholding of 
income taxes on non-resident employees, and providing for an 
exemption for employers who do business in Utah less than 
60 days in a calendar year, was passed by the Legislature on 
February 25, 1959. Both acts, which were amendments to 
Section 59-14-71, Utah Code Annotated,, 1953, as amended, 
became effective upon May 12, 1959. 
The pertinent section of Article VI, Section 22, of the 
Utah Constitution provides as follows: 
* * * and no law shall be revised or , amended by 
reference to its title only; but the act as revised, or 
section as amended, shall be re-enacted and published 
at length." 
13 
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Section 59-14-71, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
presently consists of '!- composite section born of the changes 
included in both Chapters J 11 and 112 of the Laws of. Utah, 
1959, in accordance with an Attorney General's opinion, No. 
59029, dated March 26,. 1959. However, the changes incor-
porated in the then existing law by the. passage of Chapter 
112 of the Laws of Utah, 1959, were not incorporated in 
Chapter 111 of said Laws which was enacted subsequent to 
said Chapter 112. The failure of the Legislature in enacting 
Chapter 111 to set forth the amendments previously incor-
porated in said Section 59.:14-71 by the passage of Chapter 
112 ·is clearly in violation of the above quoted constitutional 
provision.· 
In holding that the provisions of Article VI, Section 22 
of the Utah Constitution are restrictive and mandatory- requir-
ing an amended or revised section or act to be complete within 
itself, so that when published as ·revised or amended it will· 
contain all the law upon the subject embraced in the act- or 
section; this court stated as follows in State v.- Beddo, 22 U. 
432, 63 P. 96, at page 97 of the Pacific Reporter: 
"This is a wise provision ~£ the constitution, and 
was intended to avoid that confusion which would in-
evitably follow -if an act or section could be revised 
or amended by mere reference to the title or section or 
word or line as to which the change was intended to 
be made; for, after repeated amendments so made, the 
statute law would be rendered so ambiguous and im-
perfect, and in the course of time would require the 
examination of so many enactments to ascertain what 
statutes were in force, as to render any satisfactory 
determination or conclusion exceedingly difficult, if 
not impossible. Such revisions and amendments by 
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mere reference to title, however, not only render the 
statute law difficult of const~dion, but they are cal-
culated to confuse and mislead the public, and are 
therefore inimical to business transactions and · the 
interests of the people. So they have a t~ndency to 
encourage improvident legislation, by misleading the 
average legislator, who, because of numerous addi-
tions, insertions, or substitutions, made with mere 
reference to the old statute or section, is unable to 
ascertain what the exact state of the law is; and yet 
it is of the highest importance that every member of 
the legislature shall have a correct understanding of 
what the existing law is, before he attempts to revise 
or amend it. This fact was doubtless recognized by 
the framers of the constitution, who evidently intended 
the provisions above quoted as a remedy for the evils 
referred to. Therefore, when an act or a: section is re-
vised or amended the same must be_ complete within 
itself, so that when published as revised or amended 
it will contain all the law upon the subject embraced 
in the act or section; and any matter contained in the 
old statute or section which is not contained in the 
new ceases to have the force of law, except as to past 
transactions." (Emphasis added). 
An examination of Chapter 111 of the Laws of Utah, 
1959, and particularly a comparison of the same with present 
Section 59-14-71, Utah Code Annotated 1953, will reveal most 
conclusively that said Chapter 111, which was the last amend-
ment to the above code section adopted by the Legislature, is 
not complete within itself such that it contains all the law 
upon the subject embraced in that section. In fact subsections 
( 1) (b) and ( 6) thereof are not even included in said Chapter 
111. It necessarily follows that Chapter 111 of the Laws of 
Utah, 1959, violates Article VI, Section 22 of the Utah Con-
stitution. 
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POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RE-
SPONDENT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 
PLEADINGS. 
Appellant incorporates herein the arguments set forth 
under Points- I, II, and III. If any or all of said points are 
approved by this court it necessarily follows·· that the lower 
court -erred in· granting respondent's motion for judgment on 
the pleadings. 
POINT V 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT 
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS TO APPELLANT . 
.AppeHant incorporates herein the argument set forth 
under Points I, II and III, and for the reasons thereili set forth 
urges this court to hold that the lower court erred_ in failing 
to , grant judgment on the pleadings to appellant as a matter 
of law. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the above facts and the law applicable thereto 
the following conclusions are inescapable: 
1. The failure of the legislature to provide for any "re-
imbursement" to employers for their expenses incurred in the 
collection and remittance of income taxes withheld from em-
ployees' wages under Chapter 111 of the Laws of Utah, 1959, 
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is in direct conflict with the provisions of the title of said act 
and therefore violates the constitutional prohibition against 
the inclusion in legislation of subject matter which is not clearly 
expressed in the title. 
2. The limitation of the title of Chapter 111 of the Laws 
of Utah, 1959, to provide only for the withholding of income 
taxes from wages of "Resident Employees" thereunder is in 
direct conflict with the body of the act which calls for with-
holding of income taxes from all wages of all employees and 
therefore violates the constitutional prohibition against the 
inclusion in legislation of subject matter which is not clearly 
expressed in the title. 
3. The failure of the legislature in amending Section 59-
14-71 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, by its passage of 
Chapter 111 of the Laws of 1959, to include in said chapter 
the amendments to said section 59-14-71 included in Chapter 
112 of the Laws of 1959 which was passed by the Legislature 
prior to said Chapter 111 constitutes a violation of the con-
stitutional prohibition against statutory amendments which 
fail to set forth the amended sections at length. 
4. The requirement that appellant withhold and remit 
state income taxes to the respondent under Chapter 111 of 
the Laws of Utah, 1959, without compensation or reimburse-
ment for its expenses necessarily incurred thereunder consti-
tutes a taking of appellant's property without due process of 
law and subjects appellant to involuntary servitude. 
The appellant therefore asks this Honorable Court to 
declare that Chapter 111 of the Laws of Utah, 1959, is void, 
unconstitutional, ineffective, and without force of law; that 
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the appellant is not required to further comply with the terms 
and provisions of said Act; that the respondent, its agents and 
employees be permanently restrained and enjoined by the 
order of this court from exercising any of the powers, rights 
or duties respecting the enforcement of said Act against the 
appellant; and that appellant be granted its costs upon t~is 
appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES L. BARKER, JR. 
City Attorney 
JACK L. CRELLIN 
Assistant City . Attorney 
414 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
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